Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T01719R000100050004-5

TSENSITIVE

CIA/SAVA / WUIND 761684



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 24 October 1970

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.


For the President Only

Top Sorret


SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS




JULY-OCTOBER 1970 Weekly data as reported





incraesed slightly to 42 from last week's 40







dropped to 145 from 159 the previous week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.







stand at four detected and three gap fill groups with a combined strength of over 4000. The total number of infiltrators since 1 October 1970 now stands at an estimated 9600.







continued to decline as 423 were reported versus last week's 641.





rose to 1484 from the 1083 of last week.





as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces decreased to 67% from last week's 73%.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T01719R000100050004-5

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, military activity has continued at a reduced level. Most of such action as has occurred has resulted from the initiatives of Allied forces. Additional Communist forces apparently are deploying from northern South Vietnam and the western highlands to south Laos. These moves reduce the immediate Communist threat to South Vietnam's western highlands but should improve the enemy's capability to react to interdiction efforts in south Laos and are probably reflections of his extreme concern about protecting the Ho Chi Minh trail area.

In north Laos, Operation COUNTERPUNCH II is going well. Friendly forces now hold a tactically important pair of twin peaks that overlook the Plain of Jars from its southwest edge. Available evidence strongly suggests that the North Vietnamese are preparing a counterattack that will initially be directed at these twin peaks. To the west, friendly forces are consolidating positions around the former neutralist town of Muong Soui in preparation for the return of neutralist troops. In south Laos, interdiction forces have been reinforced while small unit clashes continue along the eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau.

Relative calm prevailed on the military front in Cambodia during the week. In some areas, government forces took the offensive, exploiting the lull in enemy action to reduce enemy pressure on lines of communication. As the week ended, however, both sides appeared to be more concerned with preparations for future operations than with making contact.

Enemy Infiltration

Infiltration toward South Vietnam appears to be continuing at the rate of approximately one group per day. Four positively detected groups and three "gap fill" groups, with a combined strength of over 4,000, were added to the infiltration estimate this week, raising the total number of infiltrators since 1 October 1970 to some 9,600 compared to the 4,500 for all of October 1969.

South Vietnam Developments

The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) results for September indicate a continuing favorable trend, with 93.7 percent of the population falling into the ABC category. Military Region 2 showed a countertrend (down 1.3 percent) as a result of the deteriorating security situation in the coastal area, but gains in the other three regions were sufficiently large to bring the overall gain to 0.7 percent. The VC-controlled population dropped to a probable ten-year low of 0.7 percent. The pace of the war continued to decline in September as the enemy concentrated on rebuilding his infrastructure and local forces. Terrorism, although at a higher level than a year ago, continued its five-month decline since the peak of last April.

These favorable trends in the countryside are real and not likely to be reversed easily and soon. They should not obscure the fact, however, that the Communists retain considerable strength and can and probably will cause local upsets from time to time. The Pacification Attitude Analysis Survey, for example, shows that some 60% of the respondents feel that "small to medium size VC forces can enter their hamlets at night" with impunity compared to 49% who believed this the previous month. Nevertheless, the survey shows that in many areas the security problem has receded in importance for the general public and has been replaced by concern about inflation as the number one problem.

With the July-October special emphasis pacification program coming to an end, the government is now planning a three-month campaign that will focus on four areas: 1) a nation-wide effort against the VCI which will include military action, efforts to induce rallying, and completion of the ID card program; 2) the elimination of all VC hamlets in the Delta to permit the redeployment of at least one ARVN division; 3) a special information and retraining program for government personnel; and 4) the reassignment and allocation of manpower for the 1971 plan. President Thieu launched the new program at a seminar for province officials on 23 and 24 October.

Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T01719R000100050004-5

Communist Developments

According to who defected last month, the Communists are not sanguine over their long-term prospects in South Vietnam even if their terms for a U.S. withdrawal and a coalition government are met.

cates that the Communists foresee tough sledding in the post-hostilities period because of the strength of anti-Communist forces and organizations in South Vietnam, in particular the present government apparatus. They also are concerned that the Viet Cong cadres might become demoralized and unwilling to continue the struggle once they become exposed to the unfamiliar material comforts provided by the GVN and the U.S.

25X1X

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100050004-5

25X1X

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100050004-5